Project

Birds in the Cage? How administrative litigation reshapes political control in Xi's China

Summary

This book project builds on the growing literature exploring how courts outside advanced democracies can mobilise public participation to enhance bureaucratic control while mitigating the risks of collective action. With a focus on China, we investigate how central leaders in one-party states use administrative litigation to engage popular grievances. By examining varieties of reform initiatives aimed at encouraging citizens' use of administrative litigation while curbing local governments' interference in the handling of these cases by local courts, we address the following questions on authoritarian institutions and governance: Can top-down institutional reforms in a one-party state create enduring change? How have citizens reacted to central leaders' legal mobilisation? In what ways has administrative litigation served as a "fire alarm" mechanism to address local corruption? How have initiatives aimed at enhancing the independence of local courts bolstered central leaders' top-down control?

Drawing on original court records and unique survey data, our findings contribute to understanding the changing politics of courts under Xi Jinping. Courts, typically seen as weak within authoritarian frameworks, are shown here to serve as channels for co-opting marginalised groups and addressing grievances. By selectively enforcing "justice," moreover, these courts not only pursue their own institutional interests but also create a fire alarm mechanism for detecting societal discontent in a controlled environment for the ruling party. In this sense, legal mobilisation through administrative litigation has reconstructed courts as a co-opted weapon "for" the weak, channelling grievances into institutional pathways that reduce the threat of more disruptive forms of dissent. This dynamic reflects how authoritarian regimes adapt ostensibly democratic processes to bolster stability -- particularly by incorporating controlled participation to ensure regime survival.

The project began in October 2020.

 

Project team